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
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

SUBJECT: Your Request Re Qadhafi

NESA/DI is taking the lead in pulling together some talking points and comments re what Qadhafi is up to and where he is moving in his endeavors. (NIO/NESA and [] have been apprised of your request also and have been asked to provide any input to NESA.)

I have asked this material to be provided me as soon as possible Monday morning. In the meantime, NIO/NESA has provided copies of two memoranda plus an assessment--done during the June to September time frame--that you might want to skim over the weekend.

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Date 25 Jan 85

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ROUTING SLIP

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Remarks

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Executive Secretary

31 Jan 85

Date

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC 05374-84
19 September 1984

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: Qadhafi's Recent Political Moves: Is He Weaker Than
We Had Believed?

1. The recent French-Libyan agreement for mutual withdrawal of both parties from the Chad conflict comes as something of a surprise. A superficial examination of the agreement indicates it would deprive Qadhafi of the half of Chad over which he had established control. It represents an overall weakening of his position there.

-- Qadhafi can of course renege on the agreement--this is the second time he has withdrawn from Chad. In theory he could now step up subversion in southern Chad but he would be going for dubious long term gains as opposed to the concrete ones he already had.

2. It would seem questionable to attribute this withdrawal in Chad to the recent Libyan-Moroccan union. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] even the Algerians did not believe Qadhafi would pull out. But he did.

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-- Interestingly, Syrian and Iranian dismay at the Libyan-Moroccan union would also suggest that it was hardly viewed as a breakthrough by radical forces in the Middle East.

3. The only reasonable explanation for this puzzling step by Qadhafi consistent with some of his other actions is that he is much more shaken by the May uprising in Tripoli than we had believed. [REDACTED]

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[redacted] he has grown more reclusive, ever more suspicious, [redacted]
[redacted] and trusts no one.
[redacted] by
Qadhafi's incredible fixation with security.

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-- In short, Qadhafi may be increasingly fearful of his own position internally--probably suggesting difficulties of which we are not fully aware. As we pointed out in our recent vulnerability estimate, Libyan military discontent with Chad represented a major weakness of the regime. I can only conclude that Qadhafi is cutting his losses--and gains--in Chad to relieve any pressure on him from this quarter. He may see the Moroccan union as a way to diminish potential enemies and cope with his fears of weakness.

4. We have seen wildly erratic pendulum swings in Qadhafi's behavior before and there is no reason to believe he has really changed this time. Nonetheless, the Chad withdrawal is very significant and suggests that more is going on with Libya than meets the eye.

-- [redacted]
[redacted] it has to be in the US interest and represents a net setback to Qadhafi's ambitions. In short, Qadhafi may view himself as in a more precarious situation than we have believed. We need to watch the Libyan internal scene far more closely.

Graham E. Fuller
Graham E. Fuller

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NIC 05374-84
19 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Qadhafi's Recent Political Moves: Is He Weaker Than
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NIC/NIO/NESA:GEFuller:jcn



19 Sept. 84

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